It's a clinical craft.
Dr. McGuff's exemplary experience of adaptive and creative deductivist decision-making (improvising, as Brett would say), as communicated in Dr. Sandeep Jauhar's excellent book review, "One Thing After Another" (thanks to Dave Lull), of Dr. Atul Gawande's latest masterpiece, The Checklist Manifesto, speaks to the domain-dependence of checklists/templates/standards/protocols/et al. --> They are sometimes applicable and effective support modalities in some known (concrete) engineering and repetitive (acute) intervention procedure domains, but they often prove ineffective and fail quickly in other more uncertain, novel domains (like in Dr. McGuff's case) in the following ways that the ever-insightful Dr. Jerome Groopman captures magnificently (hat tip to Dave Lull):
In my personal reflections, I've contrasted Dr. Groopman, author of How Doctors Think, and Dr. Gawande on these clear differences for some time (non-surgeon vs. surgeon, unknown vs. known, population vs. individual, etc.), and I have seen Dr. Groopman acknowledge domain-dependence straightforwardly and insightfully, as above, but have yet to see Dr. Gawande do the same. From my view, Dr. Groopman spends more time--which seems wise--considering the messy/uncertain cognitive (heuristics & biases) deduction domains, before we decide to 'operate', as Dr. McGuff did perceptively when he responded appropriately to the feedback he kept receiving from that child. Once the decision has been made to 'operate', a concrete task/objective is at hand--a mediocristan procedure like landing a plane--that is more amenable to 'checklist manifesto' infusion. Deciding whether or not to put a plane in the air in the first place in the face of bad (as well as nonlinear & chaotic, extremistan) weather is an entirely different ball game.
It's taking that particular n=1 patient's specific symptoms and presentation at the time, embedded within the context of the care episode at hand (however that unfolds), and then gathering and cataloguing data points actively through careful examination, questioning, and observation in order to deduce how best to proceed iteratively (which always includes inaction as an option).
What does this craft look like in practice?
In response to my previous essay on craft, Dr. Doug McGuff, author of Body by Science, chimed in with an awesome real-world example of medical bricolage in practice:
This weekend I experienced an opportunity for Bricolage during the resuscitation of a septic 3 week old infant. This child presented in respiratory failure (later found to be due to pneumonia and sepsis) and suffered a respiratory arrest upon presentation. We moved the child to the major resuscitation room and performed bag-valve ventilation until it started breathing on its own. However, it quickly had another apneic spell that resulted in a near cardiac arrest (when infants stop breathing their hearts slow way down and will even arrest fairly quickly). I intubated the child (who arrested during the procedure) and then quickly ventilated him until the heart rate came up and the child's vital signs returned.
Typically, we will administer a paralytic so that we can completely take over the child's breathing in order to spare it of the work of breathing. However, as we were preparing to administer a paralytic, we began to notice an unusual pattern in this child. Whenever it was breathing under its own power, the vital signs were perfect. Whenever he would have an apneic spell, his oxygen saturation would plummet and he would arrest even though we were ventilating him optimally via the endotracheal tube. Everyone involved (me, nurses, respiratory therapists) noticed this pattern and all agreed to withhold paralytics. We then developed a perfect rhythm of matching our bag-valve ventilation to the child's spontaneous respirations. Within 5 minutes, we began to notice that the child was now matching HIS respirations to our bag-valve ventilation.
When I spoke to the pediatric intensivist, I explained our observations. I expected him to recommend the standard procedure of administering paralytics, but to his credit, he felt very strongly that we should continue in the same pattern that had been working for us. There was no good physiologic explanation for this, but unless we were augmenting the child's own breathing pattern, things would just crash.
It was a very stressful resuscitation, but the child did well. This was a great example of Bricolage and of how you (for unexplainable reasons) can kill someone with templated medical care.
Talk about a positive Black Swan in emergency medicine.
That may account for the repeated failures of expert panels to identify and validate "best practices"? In large part, the panels made a conceptual error. They did not distinguish between medical practices that can be standardized and not significantly altered by the condition of the individual patient, and those that must be adapted to a particular person. For instance, inserting an intravenous catheter into a blood vessel involves essentially the same set of procedures for everyone in order to assure that the catheter does not cause infection. Here is an example of how studies of comparative effectiveness can readily prove the value of an approach by which "one size fits all." Moreover, there is no violation of autonomy in adopting "aggressive" measures of this kind to assure patient safety.
But once we depart from such mechanical procedures and impose a single "best practice" on a complex malady, our treatment is too often inadequate. Ironically, the failure of experts to recognize when they overreach can be explained by insights from behavioral economics. I know, because I contributed to a misconceived "best practice."
In my personal reflections, I've contrasted Dr. Groopman, author of How Doctors Think, and Dr. Gawande on these clear differences for some time (non-surgeon vs. surgeon, unknown vs. known, population vs. individual, etc.), and I have seen Dr. Groopman acknowledge domain-dependence straightforwardly and insightfully, as above, but have yet to see Dr. Gawande do the same. From my view, Dr. Groopman spends more time--which seems wise--considering the messy/uncertain cognitive (heuristics & biases) deduction domains, before we decide to 'operate', as Dr. McGuff did perceptively when he responded appropriately to the feedback he kept receiving from that child. Once the decision has been made to 'operate', a concrete task/objective is at hand--a mediocristan procedure like landing a plane--that is more amenable to 'checklist manifesto' infusion. Deciding whether or not to put a plane in the air in the first place in the face of bad (as well as nonlinear & chaotic, extremistan) weather is an entirely different ball game.
Dr. Doug McGuff landed a plane in a hurricane.
That's craft in practice at its finest.
You can't template that.
Undoubtedly, checklists/templates can shape/reinforce habits based on known past failures to avoid false steps in certain concrete/repetitive procedural situations, but they cannot tame complexity, uncertainty, and provide prescriptions/proscriptions (especially in longitudinal, less controlled settings) for the care of individual patients in their specific cases. Respect for the limits of knowledge (epistemology) must rule the day then. We must always, as Nassim Taleb suggests, factor for the unseen.
Somewhere, there's a transition phase/step between these two fundamentally different domains--a transition that sage physician bricoleurs like McGuff, Jauhar, and Groopman understand intimately: it's their craft that they speak about, after all, born out of experience and extensive reflection and introspection. That's being human in the practice of medicine; it's caring for Patient of One human beings by being a humble human being in the first place.
Undoubtedly, checklists/templates can shape/reinforce habits based on known past failures to avoid false steps in certain concrete/repetitive procedural situations, but they cannot tame complexity, uncertainty, and provide prescriptions/proscriptions (especially in longitudinal, less controlled settings) for the care of individual patients in their specific cases. Respect for the limits of knowledge (epistemology) must rule the day then. We must always, as Nassim Taleb suggests, factor for the unseen.
Somewhere, there's a transition phase/step between these two fundamentally different domains--a transition that sage physician bricoleurs like McGuff, Jauhar, and Groopman understand intimately: it's their craft that they speak about, after all, born out of experience and extensive reflection and introspection. That's being human in the practice of medicine; it's caring for Patient of One human beings by being a humble human being in the first place.
Like Seth Roberts' Theory of Human Evolution reiterates (hat tip to Dave Lull and Professor Aaron Blaisdell), we can make our livings in diverse ways if we identify the roles that crafts play in different domains. When it comes to healthcare domains, clinical crafts provide the foundational backbone of medicine; a backbone that is best equipped to bend but not break when bricolage carries the day.
That's, at least, what I say.
m=1/n=1, as always.
To good health,
Brent
Brent,
ReplyDeleteI'm flattered you posted my comment as a stand-alone. Let me be very clear. Templates and protocols can be VERY useful, particularly in emergent conditions when one is likely to lose sphincter tone and have their mind go blank simultaneously. It is very useful to have a protocol to revert to that has been committed to rote memory. This is important because of what I call McGuff's rule: "the greater your need to act quickly and decisively, the greater will be your tendency to hesitate". This is why emergency protocols such as ACLS or ATLS (or crash landing protocols in aviation)are useful.
However, as one gains more experience you start to realize that these protocols are merely scaffolding on which you can fill in your experiential knowledge. As you gain epistomological data, you start to recognize when you should deviate from the scaffolding. You even find circumstances where your template could prove fatal. Or as Nautilus inventor Arthur Jones once said.."Good judgement comes from experience...and experience comes from bad judgement". Sometimes you stay on the template and your patient still dies, or worse...you kill them.
What I strongly object to is protocols spawned from "Evidence-Based Medicine". These are usually derived from a committee of academic "experts" who use the literature to derive "Best Practices". The problem is, the literature is heavily biased toward positive studies and is blind to negative results. Ask your average grant whore how hard it is to get a negative study published. Another problem is that "Best Practices" are not the sort of scaffolding we discussed, really they are in place at the behest of government payors who are looking for some mechanism to legitimize denial of payment for medical services. Deviate from the "Best Practices" guideline and you don't get paid...even if the deviation saved the patient's life. Even when implemented to "cut costs" it fails to do so because an entire cottage industry of compliance experts pops up (mostly nurses who have found a career pathway that doesn't involve the messy work of actually touching patients), as well as "consultants" (also doctors and nurses who have found a way out of touching patients)who are available at a very high price to prepare us for making the compliance experts happy.
Protocols are useful when used appropriately and combined with experience that gets filed into our brain on a subconscious level. When you are on a protocol and your brain sends you the funny feeling that you should do something different...pay attention, the experience you have assimilated is trying to tell you that you are about to become the Thanksgiving Turkey.
Doug McGuff
Thanks, Dr. McGuff.
ReplyDeleteGreat additions. I like McGuff's rule.
Even the 'crash-landing protocol' needs further deductive reasoning at specific times.
Epistemocratic choice architecture would use templates/checklists to remind us about known blind spots--based upon falsification events from past history--as a supportive platform for decision-making. A skeleton with built in flexibility. This would nudge deductive logic: taking the general rules, pathways, steps contained in the protocol/algorithm and deducing how to apply them in the care of the individual patient. The optimal balance would help us avoid preventable missteps in execution while simultaneously allowing us to "keep the door to the unknown ajar" as we engross ourselves in the moment and figure out what the heck is going on.
Question: Would a medical system that integrates the financing and delivery of care, as Kaiser Permanent does, be better positioned to develop and practice_real_clinical protocols (instead of the ones you mention, which are very problematic) because it's in this type of health system's financial interest to simply provide the best patient care (which ultimately reduces costs the most)? What would be the health policy approach to ensuring epistemocratic scaffolding gets incorporated into medical practice?
In Gawande's commendable efforts, where he applies checklists in appropriate areas with excellent results, he still continually encounters difficulty getting other physicians and medical teams on board. What are ways to attack this problem of translation?
Best,
Brent
PS. For the past few years now, my mom, an outstanding nurse with over 30 years of experience, and I have discussed the 'doctors/nurses/healthcare practitioners who don't want to touch or interact with patients' problem. It's quite problematic. It's like teachers who don't want to interact with students. She sees more and more physicians and nurses engrossed with computer screens, spending more time interacting with technology than with actual patients and their families.
ReplyDeleteBest,
Brent
Brent,
ReplyDeletePart of the "EBM-Best Practices" movement is a strong push for electronic medical records (EMR). The government payors are really pushing EMR's because it helps them to collect data more easily. Administrative types endorse them because the templated charting programs force the healthcare provider to fill in the fields required to avoid denial of payment by the government payors. Once everyone is hooked on this pattern, then the governmenet payors shift around what is required to get paid, so it gets harder and harder. Ultimately, they can influence how medicine is practiced by the financial incentives they set up.
We recently switched from voice dictation to a computer-templated EMR. I used to be able to see 3 patients per hour (with a surge capacity of 10 pph); now I see 2 patients per hour, and can only surge to about 3pph. When you look around, all of the doctors and nurses are tapping on a computer screen.
If you ever want to see how it SHOULD be done...visit an emergency veterinary clinic. What is the big difference? No government payors, and minimal third party payors. My local veterinary ER sees 16,000 patients per year and has nighttime double coverage. My ER sees 40,000 per year and our night shift is single covered.
Doug McGuff, MD
Thanks, Dr. McGuff.
ReplyDeleteThe last thing we should want (if health policy were oriented correctly) from our emergency medical system is a reduction in surge capacity: flexible bandwidth is critical to the role that emergency medicine plays in society. The parasitic, fundamentally flawed 'third-party payer model' is reducing 'clinical headroom', which is moving in the opposite direction considering our health system constraints. We need to be expanding the 'clinical headroom' equation so that we can increase surge capacity and keep underlying productivity clipping along at an effective rate.
Maybe we need to write the 'Body by Science' manifesto for healthcare, 'Healthcare by Humility', with a starting note that challenges folks to go see firsthand the stark reality that we treat animals more humanely than we care for human patients. One starting lesson is Pottenger's Rule: The further you remove the principle (patient) from the agent (physician, nurse, healthcare team) financially, the further you remove these entities from one another clinically. Ever clinical decision is a financial decision, but the more that clinicians outsource the financial piece to third-parties, the more that they lose clinical autonomy and the more they degrade the intimate physician-patient healing relationship. That, coupled with McGuff's Rule, could carry things far to start.
Best,
Brent
"When you look around, all of the doctors and nurses are tapping on a computer screen."
ReplyDeleteMy pigeons are easily trained to tap (peck) at computer screens. Perhaps every health practitioner can have a pigeon on his or her shoulder to peck the information into the computer and thereby free up the practitioner to attend to his/her patients. This is a collaborative outsourcing that may actually work.
lol
ReplyDeleteNice one, Aaron!
That's one way to make emergency rooms feel more like veterinary clinics! (literally)
Outsourcing 'hoop-jumping' activities to pigeons sure seems more logical than most other health 'reform' efforts you hear these days.
Best,
Brent
@Aaron,
ReplyDeleteI think your idea is great. I just want to make sure I have the biggest pecker.
Doug
Well, Doug, you just have to get in the pecking order. We'll call it the love dove. ;-)
ReplyDeleteSeriously, I tried training pigeons to discriminate radiographs of patients with confirmed lung tumors from control patient radiographs, and they just couldn't do it. Perhaps humans are indeed better at some things than pigeons. I'm still coming to grips with this.
Brent,
ReplyDeleteYou've done an excellent job illustrating how human complexity wreaks havoc on standardized protocols. I don't think there is ever a substitute for human judgement, but I can't help but wonder how algorithms will evolve as technology advances. Will more accurate algorithms be able to better account for human variability and help inform/guide provider decisions? Does the point at which these standardized protocols are useful change as more information is aggregated and integrated in them?
Thanks, Joe.
ReplyDeleteComputers can catalogue falsification events to create databases that allow creation of algorithms that guide decision-making in routine cases (and to the extent where humans share population-level similarities). However, similar to financial models, more and more information does not necessarily lead to clinical wisdom. In fact, sometimes, given the problem of induction and the confirmation bias, more and more information in the wrong domains sets us up to be the Turkey on Thanksgiving Day. If, as I suspect, economies are manifestations of human physiology, then nonlinearities drive both and thus most computer-derived algorithms will ultimately fail in the face of fractal complexity.
Therefore, while learning from past failures is always important and computers can log these data points efficiently and provide red flags at certain check points in procedural decision-making, we must continually work in concert to train clinicians on how to act in the face of opacity and deduce how to care for specific patients in their individual cases, especially in longitudinal, non-acute settings. If n=1 biochemical individuality is as far-reaching as I think it is, then we can improve technological support systems but must always remember that every patient encounter is unique and susceptible to unknown possibilities.
If we approach aggregation of data correctly, we should focus on negative data points, given the asymmetry of knowledge, and use these technological advances to form habits that help clinicians "First, do no harm"--that seems like the Hippocratic Oath in the Information Age.
Finally, domain-dependence of checklists also applies to computer-based support: I suspect we'd be wise to reflect on that piece too. Advance Knowledge Civilization can accomplish a lot in ER, Trauma, Surgery, and other concrete domains, but we still fail miserably when it comes to figuring out how to care for diffuse and patchy cases like those linked to the metabolic syndrome and the diseases of civilization.
Best,
Brent